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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IRWIN RYAN RAY ADAMS,

)

)
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v.

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent.

)

NO. 39842
JEROME COUNTY NO. CV 2011-1256

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Irwin Ryan Adams crashed his car and killed his passenger and best friend, Allen
Larson. At trial, Mr. Adams testified that he was being chased by another car and was
traveling at approximately 75 miles per hour when he lost control and crashed. The
State, on the other hand, presented statements allegedly made by Mr. Adams asserting
he was traveling at over 100 miles per hour, and further presented testimony from an
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Idaho State Police (hereinafter, ISP) accident reconstructionist claiming that Mr. Adams
was travelling at 108 miles per hour at the time of the crash. 1
Mr. Adams filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raising multiple issues
including a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the testimony
of Carl Cover, his own accident reconstructionist, who would have opined that
Mr. Adams was travelling between 70 and 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash,
and a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present
evidence that, due to pre-existing damage to his car's motor, he could not have driven
faster than 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash.

Mr. Adams supported his

accident reconstructionist claim with affidavits from Carl Cover, detailing his contact with
trial counsel, and detailing his expertise and conclusions.

Mr. Adams supported his

damaged motor claim to his with an affidavit from a mechanic who examined the motor,
and affidavits of two other people establishing a chain of custody.
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Adams'

petition erroneously

concluding that that it was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing even where there
is a genuine issue of material fact, apparently based upon a false understanding of
Idaho precedent and a disregard for the plain language of I.C. § 19-4906(b). In State v.
Adams, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 790 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2013) (hereinafter

Opinion), the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's opinion based upon its own
apparent misunderstanding of this Court's clear precedent.

Because the Court of

Appeals' Opinion is contrary to this Court's clear precedent, Mr. Adams asks this Court
to grant his Petition for Review. If granted, Mr. Adams asks this Court to vacate the
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Mr. Adams' direct appeal is the subject of Supreme Court docket number 38910.
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district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and to
remand his case to the district court with instructions that the court hold an evidentiary
hearing.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On October 24, 2009, while driving with his best friend in the passenger seat, 19year old Irwin "Ryan" Adams lost control of his car (a 1995 Saturn) and careened into a
field, where the vehicle flipped, and Allen Larson died from the injuries he sustained.
(Tr. 38910, p.204, L.23 - p.205, L. 1, p.206, Ls.4-9.)2 The following May, the State filed
a Criminal Complaint charging Mr. Adams with vehicular manslaughter and, after a
preliminary hearing, Mr. Adams was bound over into the district court in June of 2010.
(R., p.56.)

At trial, the State presented accident reconstruction testimony tending to show
that Mr. Adams' Saturn was going at least 108 miles per hour moments before the
crash. (Tr. 38910, p.138, Ls.2-18.) The State also presented testimony from a number
of individuals claiming to have heard Mr. Adams say that he was going anywhere from
100 to 110 miles per hour before the crash, and that he was chasing after his girlfriend,
Shayna Gonzales, at the time.

(Tr. 38910, p.82, L.17 - p.91, L.3 (Brian Constable

testifying that after picking up Shayna Gonzales and her mother, Teresa StoneBroncheau, at Shayna's home, he was followed by Mr. Adams), p.99, L.10-p.116, L.2
(Ms. Stone-Broncheau testifying that after Mr. Constable picked her and Shayna up,
they were all chased by Mr. Adams), p.218, Ls.3-10, 19-20 (Stephanie Nevarez, Allen's
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This Court granted Mr. Adams' motion requesting that this Court take judicial notice of
the transcripts of the jury trial as the district court has done so in this case. (See R.,
pp.58, 123.) Although no transcripts were specifically created for this appeal, citations
to the transcripts herein will contain the designation "Tr. 3891 O."
3

sister, testifying that Mr. Adams told her he was driving, "trying to get some other people
to put a baby in a car seat or something," and "that he was probably going around a
hundred"), p.225, Ls.17-18 (Josh Kimbrough testifying that Mr. Adams said "[h]e was
going 11 0 and he was being-he was chasing Shayna and then they wrecked"), p.226,
Ls.1-10 (same), p.234, L.11 (Brandy Kimbrough testifying that Mr. Adams said "he was
going about 110"), p.235, Ls.7-18 (Brandy Kimbrough testifying that Mr. Adams said he
"was chasing Shayna because they broke up and she got mad and left"), p.243, Ls.9-14
(Larry Kimbrough testifying that "[h]e [Mr. Adams] told me that he hit 110 chasing after
Shayna" because they had had a fight and she left), p.249, Ls.3-6, 18-22 (Marissa
Dempsey, Larry Kimbrough's girlfriend, testifying that Mr. Adams said he was going 110
mph, and that "he was chasing Shayna because they broke up and he was-he wanted
to talk to her or something").) 3
However, the State also offered substantial evidence tending to show that
Mr. Adams was only going about 75 miles per hour, and that he was the one who was
being chased. (Tr. 38910, p.158, L.20 - p.159, L.22 (Cpl. Sean Walker testifying that

3

Later, Mr. Adams offered significant evidence tending to show that the conversations
testified to by Ms. Nevarez and the Kimbrough family never happened. (See, e.g., Tr.
38910, p.286, L.17 - p.289, L.5 (Kevin Adams, Ryan Adams' father, testifying that he
was with his son at the hospitals (for much of the time that Ryan was there) where Ryan
supposedly confessed to Ms. Nevarez and various members of the Kimbrough family,
and that Ryan was not out of his sight and did not speak to the Kimbroughs), p.321, L.8
- p.322, L 19 (Mr. Adams testifying that he never spoke to Ms. Nevarez or the
Kimbroughs about the crash), p.344, L.11 - p.349, L.13 (Shawna Lanting, Mr. Adams'
father's fiancee, offering testimony that was substantively identical to that of Mr. Adams'
father), p.367, L.18 - p.372, L.25 (LaRey Adams, one of Mr. Adams' sisters, testifying
that she was with her brother at two of the three relevant hospitals, that Mr. Adams
virtually never left her side, and that she never saw him speak to the Kimbroughs or talk
to anyone about the crash), p.391, L.20 - p.397, L.2 (Kendra Adams, one of Mr. Adams'
other sisters, offering testimony that was substantively identical to that of LaRey
Adams).)
4

when he came upon the crash scene and interviewed Mr. Adams, who was extremely
upset, he stated that he was not going over 75 mph, and that he had been chased),
p.167, L.3

p.168, L.1 (same), p.173, L.1 - p.174, L.14 (Sgt. Keith Thompson testifying

that when he interviewed Mr. Adams at the crash scene, he indicated that he had been
going approximately 75 miles per hour, and that he had been chased), p.190, Ls.1-4
(Det. Kirk Thorpe testifying that when he interviewed Mr. Adams at the crash scene, he
indicated that he had been chased), p.196, Ls.13-16 (Dep. Lawrence Green testifying
that when he interviewed Mr. Adams at the crash scene, Mr. Adams indicated that he
had been chased), p.198, Ls.1-7 (Dep. Green testifying that, moments later, he
overheard Mr. Adams talking to his father on the phone, stating that he was "doing
about 80," and that he had been chased), p.198, Ls.7-13 (Dep. Green testifying that
when he questioned Mr. Adams further, he reiterated that he had been chased), p.106,
Ls.12-13 (Kathie Allison, a good Samaritan who happened to be the first person at the
scene of the crash, testifying that Mr. Adams said he had been chased), p.218, Ls.4-15
(Stephanie Nevarez testifying that Mr. Adams initially told her that "he was probably
going like around 65 or 70" and that he was being chased), p.248, L.24 - p.249, L.22
(Marissa Dempsey testifying that Mr. Adams initially stated that he had been chased).)
Mr. Adams himself testified that he was followed, and at times tailgated, by a
light-colored car which turned when he turned, stopped when he stopped (even when
he pulled over to let the car pass), and accelerated when he accelerated; he further
testified that he was going approximately 75 mph shortly before he crashed, and he
denied ever having told anyone that he was driving 110-120 miles per hour. (Tr. 38910,
p.299, L.22 - p.306, L.10, p.312, L.16 - p.313, L.11.) In fact, he denied ever having
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spoken to Ms. Nevarez or the Kimbroughs about the crash at all. (Tr. 38910, p.321, L.8
- p.322, L.19.) Mr. Adams also offered the testimony of his father who, just like all of
the police officers who testified, had heard him say that he had been chased.
(Tr. 38910, p.336, Ls.7-13.)
The jury was instructed both on vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence,
and the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence, as
well as the definitions of "gross negligence" and "negligence." (Tr. 38910, p.424, L.12 p.428, L.1.)

Mr. Adams was found guilty of the greater offense of vehicular

manslaughter by gross negligence. (Tr. 38910, p.485, L.12 - p.486, L.1.)
Mr. Adams filed a timely Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raising three main
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 1) Both his first attorney, Dan Taylor, and
his second attorney, Stacy Gosnell, failed to properly investigate the identity of two
witnesses, one of whom posted information on an on-line news site that he and his wife
had come upon the accident shortly after it occurred; 2) both Mr. Taylor and Ms. Gosnell
failed to properly communicate with and ultimately call as a witness, Carl Cover, an
accident reconstructionist hired by Mr. Taylor, who would have testified that the
calculations made by the ISP were erroneous, and that by his own calculations
Mr. Adams was traveling between 70 and 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash;
and 3) Ms. Gosnell failed to investigate information provided by Mr. Adams that his car's
engine was damaged prior to the accident rendering it incapable of producing enough
power to get the car to travel more than 75 miles per hour. (R., pp.4-25.) Mr. Adams
asserted in his verified petition that, prior to the accident, he had noticed damage to his
motor and that he could hear a constant knocking noise, and he asked Ms. Gosnell
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about pursuing this line of defense, but she told him '"We have this in the bag, so keep it
simple, stupid."' (R., pp.4-25.) He also reiterated his claim that he was traveling no
more than 75 miles per hour and being chased by another vehicle at the time of
accident. (R., pp.4-25.)
In support of his petition, Mr. Adams provided affidavits from his father,
Kevin Adams, who stated that after 4 or 5 days in an impound yard, Kevin Adams had
the car at his home for about six months before he sold it to Larry Harms. (R., pp.3032.)

Kevin Adams further stated that he retrieved the engine in July of 2011 from

Mr. Harms. (R., pp.30-32.) Larry Harms provided an affidavit stating that 2 or 3 weeks
after taking possession of the car, he removed the motor and crushed the body

he did

not try to start or alter the motor in any way before Kevin Adams retrieved it. (R., pp.4648.)

Ron Stone, the service manager at a car repair shop, provided an affidavit

attesting to the damage to the motor and that, "while it is within the realm of possibility
that the motor I disassembled and observed could have still produced speeds of up to
one hundred eight (108) miles per hour, in my opinion it is highly unlikely due to its
mechanical condition." (R., pp.26-29.)

Finally, Mr. Adams provided an affidavit and

accompanying documentation from Carl Cover, the accident reconstructionist hired by
Dan Taylor, who attested that, based upon the documentation he was provided by
Mr. Taylor, he concluded that the Idaho State Police calculations of speed "were clearly
erroneous based on their own calculations" and that he believed Mr. Adams was
traveling between 70 and 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash.

(R., pp.33-45.)

Mr. 5 8Cover further attested that he communicated his conclusions to Mr. Taylor via a
telephone call and asked for more information to determine the possibility of whether
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Mr. Adams' car was struck from behind causing the accident, but he never heard from
Mr. Taylor again, and he had never heard of Ms. Gosnell at all. (R., pp.33-45.)
The district court appointed counsel and entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
(R., pp.55-75.)4

The State filed an Answer.

(R., pp.76-78.) 5

Mr. Adams filed a

Memorandum in Opposition to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, wherein he conceded that he
had no further information on whom the two potential witnesses are, but he also
asserted that his remaining claims require an evidentiary hearing.

(R., pp.91-107.)

Mr. Adams included an additional affidavit from Mr. Cover explaining further the bases
of his calculations and conclusions that the ISP reconstructionists were wrong, and that
Mr. Adams was traveling between 70 and 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash.
(R., pp.86-90.) Mr. Adams further provided an affidavit from Stacy Gosnell who attested

that Mr. Taylor relayed to her that Mr. Cover's conclusion was that Mr. Adams was
traveling at 90 miles per hour at the time of the crash, and that had she known that
Mr. Cover would have testified that Mr. Adams was traveling between 70 and 75 miles
per hour, she would have called him to testify. (R., pp.109-115.) Mr. Adams provided
an additional affidavit from his father, Kevin Adams, providing greater detail about his
handling of the car and its engine. (R., pp.116-119.)

Although Mr. Adams believes the district court was incorrect in some of the analysis
provided in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, he does not claim that he was deprived
proper notice of the court's purported reasons for dismissal. The district court's Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was detailed and, therefore, the contents
of the court's notice will not be discussed in detail in this Appellant's Brief.
5 Because the district court did not ultimately base its dismissal on the State's Answer,
the contents of the Answer will not be discussed in this Appellant's Brief.
4
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The district court entered an Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
explaining the court's reasoning for dismissing the petition. 6

(R., pp.120-143.)

The

district court found that Mr. Adams failed to demonstrate what the two witnesses who
were not found by his attorneys would have testified to and, therefore, found that
Mr. Adams failed to show that, had the witnesses been called, there is a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different.7 (R., pp.124-126.) Regarding the
failure to provide his accident reconstructionist's testimony, the district court found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel was deficient.
(R., pp.126-134.)

However, the court weighed the testimony of the ISP accident

reconstructionist against the affidavits of Mr.

Cover;

concluded that the ISP

reconstructionist's testimony was more believable and that Mr. Cover's proposed
testimony was speculative; found that the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that
Mr. Adams was grossly negligent, regardless of whether he was travelling 75 miles per
hour or 108 miles per hour; found that the issue of gross negligence "is a matter for
direct appeal and is not subject to post conviction relief'; and found that Mr. Adams "has
failed to present admissible evidence sufficient to undermine the verdict of the jury and,
therefore, has failed to present a triable issue relative to the prejudice prong of
Strickland." (R., pp.134-140.) Finally, the district court found there was no showing of

how long before trial Mr. Adams informed his counsel about the motor's condition, and
found that even if the evidence was admitted, it would have shown that Mr. Adams was

6

The district court filed a document entitled Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice four
days later. (R., pp.144-145.) Mr. Adams' Notice of Appeal is timely from both
documents. (R., pp.155-159.)
7 Mr. Adams does not challenge the dismissal of this claim in this appeal.
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attempting to drive as fast as possible, which would not undermine the jury's verdict. 8
(R., pp.140-142.)

Mr. Adams filed a timely Notice of Appeal and he raised two claims. (R., pp.155159; Appellant's Brief.) First, Mr. Adams asserted that the district court erroneously
weighed the trial testimony of the State's accident reconstructionist against the affidavits
of Carl Cover, reached its own conclusions as to the purported flaws in Mr. Cover's
conclusions, and deemed that, even if his testimony was presented, it would not have
made a difference. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-18.) Second, Mr. Adams asserted that the
district court erred in determining, without an evidentiary hearing, that he was not
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to present evidence that his car's motor was
damaged. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.)
Just as the district court had done before, the Court of Appeals weighed the
information provided by Mr. Cover in his affidavits and determined that "the evidence
was conclusory and speculative and therefore would not have been admissible at trial."
(Opinion, pp.6-9.) The Court further held that Mr. Adams failed to show prejudice in
either of his claims, agreeing with the district court's determination that even if the jury
was presented with evidence that Mr. Adams was only driving 75 mph, there was still
sufficient evidence to establish gross negligence. (Opinion, pp.9, 10.) Mr. Adams filed
a timely Petition for Review.
The district court also found that the doctrine of spoliation would apply, apparently
preventing Mr. Adams from presenting evidence of the condition of the vehicle, which
had been destroyed, after the motor was removed. Although Mr. Adams does not
dispute that evidence of the condition of the body of the car could not be presented in
his post-conviction proceedings due to the fact that it no longer exists, he asserts that
the doctrine of spoliation would not apply as the car was sold to the wrecker by his
father, who was not a party to the litigation, and the car was sold prior to the State filing
charges, i.e., when no litigation was actually pending.
8
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ISSUE
Should this Court grant Mr. Adams' Petition for Review and ultimately vacate the district
court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this
case for an evidentiary hearing?

11

ARGUMENT

This Court Should Grant Mr. Adams' Petition For Review And Ultimately Vacate The
District Court's Order Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And
Remand This Case For An Evidentiary Hearing
A

Introduction
Upon its own motion, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Adams' petition

for post-conviction relief after weighing the evidence presented at trial, against affidavits
provided by Mr. Adams. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision after
it weighed Mr. Adams' proffered evidence, and were "persuaded" that the evidence was
"conclusory and speculative" and would not have been admissible at trial. The Court of
Appeals' decision violates the plain language of I.C. § 19-4906(b) and is contrary to this
Court's prior holdings recognizing that summary dismissal is not appropriate where
there is a genuine issue of material fact. This court should grant Mr. Adams' Petition for
Review, vacate the district court's order granting summary dismissal, and remand the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
B.

This Court Should Grant Mr. Adams' Petition For Review Because The Court Of
Appeals' Opinion Violates The Plain Language Of I.C. § 19-4906(b) And Is
Contrary To This Court's Precedent
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that this Court has discretion over whether

to grant a Petition for Review of a final decision of the Court of Appeals. I.AR. 118(b).
Among the criteria this Court should consider includes "[w]hether the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of
the Idaho Supreme Court or of the United States Supreme Court." I.AR. 118(b)(2).
The Court of Appeals' decision in the present case violates the plain language of I.C. §
19-4906(b) and this Court's precedent interpreting that statute.
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Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction
relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its
reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply
within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default
thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file
an amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise
continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if
there exists a material issue of fact.
I.C. § 19-4906(b) (emphasis added).

A district court may summarily dismiss a post-

conviction petition only where the petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to
raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would
entitle him or her to the relief requested. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008).
"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the consequential facts[,]' Black's Law

Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties." Id.
'"[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences."' Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (quoting Riverside Dev.

Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (emphasis added).) Furthermore,
"When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion
for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts."

Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991) (emphasis added).)
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a
13

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry

of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be

regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party,
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).
Despite this Court's clear precedent requiring disputed facts to be construed in
favor of the non-moving party, and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party" (id.), the Court of Appeals stated
in the present case, "[b]ecause the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact
in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district court is not constrained to draw
inferences in the petitioner's favor, but is free to arrive at the most probable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence." (Opinion, p.4 (citing Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444; Wolf
v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67 (Ct. App. 2011); Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 553, 555 (Ct. App.

2008).) While Yakovac makes clear that a trial court is free to draw inferences only
from undisputed evidence, the Court of Appeals makes fails to recognize this
distinction. 9

This is not the first time the Court of Appeals has failed to recognize this distinction.
See Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing to Yakovac for the propostion
that "because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an
9
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In the present case, the Court of Appeals found,
The record reflects that the expert's opinions are not based on the
detailed discussion of the techniques and calculations testified to at trial by
the State's expert witness. Rather, the expert's opinions are based upon
data originally provided to the expert by Adams' first defense counsel
months before the trial occurred. According to the supplemental affidavit,
the expert did not take measurements or apply his own procedures.
Moreover, the expert was unable to point out where the alleged error
existed, other than to say, "only that it is my opinion that an error did
occur."
(Opinion, p.8.) The Court concluded that the proffered evidence was "conclusory and
speculative and therefore would not have been admissible at trial."

(Opinion, p.9.)

Mr. Cover provided his curriculum vitae and his affidavits stated that his conclusion that
Mr. Adams was travelling between 70 and 75 mph at the time of the crash, was based
upon the same evidence that the ISP reconstructionist based her calculations upon.
(R., pp.33-41, 85-89.) The Court of Appeals could have only reached its conclusion by

either weighing Mr. Cover's affidavit against the testimony of the ISP reconstructionist,
and concluding that the ISP reconstructionist was more believable, or by making
inferences against Mr. Adams. However, on review of a dismissal of a post-conviction
relief application without an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court must determine
whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and
admissions together with any affidavits on file. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct.
App. 1993). Idaho Appellate Courts do not make their own credibility determinations

evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible
for resolving the conflict between those inferences" and "the judge in a post-conviction
action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be
drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.")
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when reviewing what transpired in the district court. See Whitely v. State, 131 Idaho
323, 326 (1998).
The legal analysis applied by the Court of Appeals in this case violates this
Court's clear precedent.

Therefore, this Court should grant Mr. Adams' Petition for

Review.
C.

If This Court Grants Review, It Should Find That The District Court Erred In
Summarily Dismissing Mr. Adams' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief As There
Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Adams Was
Prejudiced By His Counsel's Failure To Call His Accident Reconstructionist, Who
Would Have Testified That Mr. Adams' Car Was Traveling Between 70 And 75
Miles Per Hour At The Time Of The Accident

1.

Introduction

The district court erroneously weighed the trial testimony of the State's accident
reconstructionist against the affidavits of Carl Cover, reached its own conclusions as to
the purported flaws in Mr. Cover's conclusions, and deemed that, even if his testimony
was presented, it would not have made a difference. In essence, the district court made
factual determinations despite there being a genuine issue of material fact, without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, and further concluded that even if the jury heard the
testimony that the court itself would not hear, the jury would have still concluded that
Mr. Adams was guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence, rather than
without gross negligence, or not guilty of any crime. The district court erred and this
Court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
2.

10

Standards Of Review 10

Additional standard of review authority is articulated in section B, supra.
16

A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil, rather than criminal,
in nature, and like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations upon which the requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the
evidence. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443 (2008).

However, unlike a plaintiff in

other civil cases, the original post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a
short and plain statement of the claim." Id. at 443-444. The application must present or
be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein,
or else the post-conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id.

In addition, the

post-conviction petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the
application is based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings.

Thomas v. State, 185 P.3d 921 (Ct. App. 2008).

To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that
trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668,687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). Where a defendant
shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 760.
3.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Adams' Claim That His Trial
Counsel's Failure To Present The Testimony Of His Accident
Reconstructionist Was Prejudicial

Despite there being two opposing conclusions, offered by experts for each party,
as to how fast Mr. Adams was traveling at the time of the crash, the district court
erroneously weighed the affidavits of Mr. Cover against the testimony of the ISP
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reconstructionist, and concluded that the ISP reconstructionist was correct. The court
further reached the erroneous legal conclusion that even if the jury believed that
Mr. Adams was traveling no more than 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash, it
would have still found him guilty of the greater offense of vehicular manslaughter with
gross negligence.
a.

The District Court Erroneously Weighed Disputed Facts In Favor Of
Its Own Viewpoint. Rather Than In Favor Of The Non-Moving Party,
Mr. Adams

In both its Notice of Intent to Dismiss and in its Order Dismissing Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, the district court indicated that it believed that, despite the fact
that there was a genuine issue of material fact, an evidentiary hearing was not
necessary because the district court was the trier of fact. (R., p.60 ("Because this Court
is the trier of fact in post-conviction cases, this Court is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

This Court is free to arrive at the most

probable inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidence." (citing Hayes v.

State, 146 Idaho 353, 355 (Ct. App. 2008)); pp.122-123 (same).)

The court's

understanding of its powers and responsibilities in this regard was erroneous.
The statement in Hayes, relied upon by the district court in this case, is taken
from State v. Yakovac - a case in which the underlying operative facts were actually not
in dispute by the parties, as they involved trial counsel's failure to make certain
evidentiary objections - the absence of which was apparent from the face of the trial
record. See Hayes at 355 (citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437); see also Yakovac,
at 444-447. In that context, the Idaho Supreme Court held that:
When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion

18

for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991)

(emphasis added)).
This rule was taken from the prior civil case of Loomis v. City of Hailey.

In

Loomis, the parties stipulated to the fact that there were no genuine issues of material

facts - only questions of how the law should apply to the facts that were agreed upon by
all parties. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437. Thus, the rule articulated in Hayes and relied
upon by the district court, arose from both Yakovac and Loomis, and is expressly limited
to only those cases where there is no disputed evidence regarding the issue to be
determined by the trial court for summary disposition purposes.

The standard that

should have been applied by the district court is stated in Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44
(2009). "Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party." Vavold, 148 Idaho at 45 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Mr. Adams clearly established a genuine issue of material
fact as to a core issue in his case - how fast he was traveling at the time of the crash.
The State claimed that he was traveling 108 miles per hour based upon its own expert's
testimony, while Mr. Adams claimed both at trial and in his post-conviction petition, that
he was traveling no more than 75 miles per hour at the time of the crash. This meets
the definition of an issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). However, rather than recognizing that the court needed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing where Mr. Cover could present his testimony live, with each of the
parties questioning him on the quality of his credentials, and the accuracy of his
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calculations, the district court weighed the evidence in favor of the State and criticized
the specifics of Mr. Cover's conclusions. (R., pp.135-136 (noting that Mr. Cover had not
reviewed Trooper Gibb's testimony and, therefore, his criticism is based upon an
incomplete understanding of the testimony), p.136 (finding that Mr. Cover's opinion "is
suspect based on his supplemental affidavit"), pp.136-137 (finding that Mr. Cover's
opinions are "conclusory and speculative" and inferring he lacks credibility because,
although he asked trial counsel for photographs of the scene of the accident, he did not
believe they would change his opinion.)

Of course, had the district court actually

conducted the required evidentiary hearing, Mr. Cover would have been allowed to
explain these issues that the district court found so perplexing.

The district court's

failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is erroneous, and this Court should remand
this case with instructions that such an evidentiary hearing be conducted.
b.

The District Court Erred In Finding That Even If Trial Counsel Had
Presented Mr. Cover's Testimony, The Result Of The Trial Would
Not Have Changed

In addition to questioning the veracity of Mr. Cover's proffered testimony, the
district court found that even had that testimony been presented, Mr. Adams did not
meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. The district court again erred.
The district court found that the evidence presented demonstrated that
Mr. Adams was chasing another car, and not the other way around, apparently based
upon the disputed trial testimony.

(R., pp.138-139.) The court reasoned that a jury

would conclude that Mr. Adams was acting with gross negligence regardless of whether
he was traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 50
miles per hour, or 50 to 60 plus miles per hour over the posted speed limit. (R., pp.138-
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140.)

The district court concluded, "The petitioner has failed to present admissible

evidence sufficient to undermine the verdict of the jury and, therefore, has failed to
present a triable issue relative to the prejudice prong of Strickland." (R., p.140.)
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Adams' speed was relevant not only
to his culpability, but to his credibility. 11 Mr. Adams maintained that he was traveling no
more than 75 miles per hour and being chased by another car, while other evidence
suggested that Mr. Adams was the one doing to the chasing.

The State's expert

testified that Mr. Adams was traveling 108 miles per hour at the time of the crash. A
jury could certainly conclude that if Mr. Adams was lying about his speed, which if they
believed the State's experts they no doubt would believe Mr. Adams was lying about his
speed, then there exists a reasonable possibility that the jury would believe he was lying
about being chased.

Had the jury heard Mr. Cover's testimony that Mr. Adams was

traveling at 75 miles per hour and found this testimony to be credible, there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found all of Mr. Adams' testimony to be
credible and found that he was, in fact, being chased.

If the jury reached this

conclusion, there is a reasonable probability that it would have either found Mr. Adams
not guilty of any crime, or guilty of the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter

without gross negligence.

In fact, had a single juror found Mr. Adams' story to be

credible, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have been unable to agree
upon a verdict and a mistrial would have been declared - a result different than a
conviction.

11

The Court of Appeals failed to address this argument in its opinion and instead simply
agreed with the district court. (Opinion, pp.9-10.)
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Furthermore, Mr. Adams' speed was certainly a critical consideration for the jury.
Had the jury concluded that Mr. Adams was traveling between 70 and 75 miles per
hour, the jury may have concluded that his actions did not amount to gross negligence "a wanton, flagrant or reckless disregard of consequences or willful indifference of the

safety or rights of others" - and may have found that he merely acted negligently - "a
lack of that attention to the probable consequences of an act or omission which a
prudent person ordinarily would apply to the person's own affairs." (See Tr. 38910,
p.424, L.12 - p.428, L.1 Oury instructions).) Drivers speed all of the time - most drivers
do not travel more than twice the speed limit. Whether a person drives 40 miles per
hour in a 20 mile per hour school zone, 70 miles per hour down a state highway located
within a city's limits, or 150 miles per hour on a rural interstate, a jury is likely to find that
person is demonstrating a reckless disregard for the safety of others. While driving 20
to 25 miles per hour over the speed limit should not be encouraged, there is a
reasonable probability that a jury would have concluded that, at worse, this is negligent
behavior - not gross negligence.
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Adams' claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to present Mr. Cover's testimony.
D.

If This Court Grants Review, It Should Find The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing Mr. Adams' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief As There Was A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Trial Counsel Was Deficient
In Failing To Present Evidence That His Motor Was Damaged Prior To The
Accident And There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether He
Was Prejudiced By His Counsel's Deficient Performance
The district court found that even if evidence was presented demonstrating that

the motor could not produce speeds in excess of 75 miles hour, such evidence would

22

not undermine the verdict and, therefore, was not prejudicial.

The district court's

dismissal of this claim is in error.
The district court found that "there is no showing as to when, in relation to the
start of the trial, counsel was allegedly informed of any mechanical deficiencies."
(R., p.141.) Mr. Adams attested in his verified petition, and it was not disputed by any
other evidence, that he informed Ms. Gosnell of this issue prior to trial. (R., p.18.) Had
the district court considered the timing of this communication crucial to its conclusion,
the district court should have had an evidentiary hearing to determine exactly how close
to the start of the trial this question was raised.

The district court erred in failing to

conduct an evidentiary hearing on his issue.
In addition, the court found that for the same reasons it stated in relationship to
Mr. Cover's proposed testimony, there was no prejudice.

(R., p.142.) For the same

reasons articulated in section C(3)(b) above, the district court's conclusion is in error.
The district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review,
vacate the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief, and remand his case to the district court with instructions that an evidentiary
hearing be conducted on the issues of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
present Mr. Cover's expert accident reconstruction testimony, and whether trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to present evidence of the condition of the motor prior to the
accident.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2014.
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